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Abstract
We consider how conceptions of the self and identity from the philosophical literature can help us
to understand identity disturbance in borderline personality disorder (BPD). We present 3 philo-
sophical approaches: connectedness, narrative, and agency. We show how these map on to 3 dif-
ferent ways in which the self can be temporally extended. The connectedness approach is
dominant in philosophy, and the narrative approach has been used by psychiatry, but we argue that
the lesser‐known agency approach provides a promising way to theorize some aspects of identity
disturbance in BPD. It relates the 2 diagnostic criteria of identity disturbance and disinhibition
and is consistent with evidence of memory deficits and altered self‐processing in BPD patients.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Identity disturbance is the core feature of borderline personality disorder
(BPD).1-6 DSM‐5 describes 2 types of impairment of self‐functioning7:
1. identity: The self is impoverished, poorly developed, or there is an
unstable self‐image, which is often associated with excessive self‐
criticism; chronic feelings of emptiness; and dissociative states
under stress,
2. self‐direction: instability in goals, aspirations, values, and career
plans.
However, the classification of identity disturbance is diffuse, cov-
ering a wide range of indicators.8 Clinically, the notion of identity dis-
turbance corresponds to severe difficulties in describing personal
features of oneself and others, as well as problems in developing a
sense of self with beliefs, interests, and life goals that are stable over
time. This can take the form of extreme and polarized self‐conceptions,
feelings of puzzlement about changes in the self, lack of a coherent
image of self, explosive shifts into states where the perception of self
is distorted and shows weak correspondence with external reality, a
lack of capacity to flexibly adapt oneself to changes, rapidly changing
roles and relationships, discontinuity in self‐experience, and no clear
concept of self‐development. Patients identify only with their present
affective states and have no sense of their continuity over time, lead-
ing Fuchs to describe the phenomenology of identity in BPD as an
“atemporal mode of existing.”9
Philosophers also use the concept of identity, although they do so
in different ways and contexts. The word “identity” can be a false
friend to psychiatrists because, in the philosophical discussion of per-
sonal identity, both “person” and “identity” are technical terms. The
problem of identity is the general one of what it is to persist over time.
It can equally be applied to objects, the classic example being whether
a lump of clay and the statue that it becomes are the same thing. A
“person” is a normative notion, introduced by Locke, of a rational being
who is a locus of moral accountability.10 Hence, the criteria for
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personal identity might be different from the criteria for identity of
animals and inanimate objects.
“Self” is sometimes used in philosophy, but it is not defined consis-
tently and philosophers have disagreed about whether that means that
they should stop using it.11-13 For instance, Locke used “self” to refer
to a momentary entity with subjective, phenomenological experi-
ences10; many have followed him in this usage.14,15 However,
MacIntyre has used “self” to reference the unity of a life16 and Taylor
has used “self” synonymously with “person” and “human agent.”17
For both MacIntyre and Taylor, a self is something that is constructed,
rather than experienced. In this paper, we will use “self” as an umbrella
term that does not imply any one specific usage.
We will explore different conceptions of self over time from the
philosophical literature and consider their utility for understanding
BPD. We present 3 philosophical approaches, connectedness, narrative,
and agency and show how these map on to 3 different ways in which the
self can be temporally extended. The connectedness approach is domi-
nant in philosophy, and the narrative approach has been used by psychi-
atry, but we argue that the lesser‐known agency approach provides a
promising way to theorize some aspects of identity disturbance in BPD.
2 | THREE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES
TO IDENTITY AND SELF OVER TIME
The traditional philosophical problem of personal identity is one in
metaphysics, about the persistence of persons across time: If we take
a person X at time 1 and a person Y at time 2, what would make X
and Y one and the same person, and under what conditions would
we want to say that X had ceased to exist and a new entity Y had come
into being? Or: Are X and Y one person or two? However, personal
identity is also relevant for answering other philosophical questions
that relate to practical concerns, such as whether and why people
should care about their future pleasure or pain (egoistic concern); why
we can attribute moral responsibility to someone for her past actions
(moral concern); and why we think that we can compensate someone
for a burden born at another time in her life, but we cannot compen-
sate someone else for the burden she bears (compensatory concern).
Some philosophers have argued that starting with persistence is the
wrong way to address these questions about our practical concerns.
Criticisms of the persistence approach have led to the development
of 2 other approaches. Hence, we start with the persistence approach.
1. Persistence and connectedness
For philosophers, the traditional question of personal identity is
about persistence: What continuity is necessary for my survival and
what sort of changes would result in my ceasing to exist? Historically,
philosophers like Plato in the Phaedo and Descartes in the Meditations
thought that continued existence was due to the presence of an imma-
terial soul. However, contemporary debate is between psychological
continuity and biological continuity views of personal identity.
Psychological continuity views, where persistence is determined by
the endurance of your mental features, enjoy most popularity nowadays.
They originate with Locke, who focused on continuity of memory.10
Contemporary philosophers have broadened the criteria to include other
psychological connections such as intentions, beliefs, desires, goals, and
similarity of character. The best known modern psychological continuity
theory is that of Derek Parfit, who defines strong connectedness as
“the holding of particular direct psychological connections” and psycho-
logical continuity as “the holding of overlapping chains of strong connect-
edness” (italics in the original), where strong connectedness remains to be
cashed out fully but consists of “enough direct connections.”18* So
according to Parfit, I am strongly connected to myself yesterday and to
myself tomorrow, given that no dramatic changes have happened. I may
not be strongly connected to myself 20 years ago—I may have forgotten
some of the things I did, changed some of beliefs and desires, and become
a rather different character—but I am psychologically continuous in virtue
of the strong connectedness that holds over smaller units of time.
The persistence question is a technical question about ontology.
We might say that someone who suffers amnesia is no longer the same
person because they have changed. But there are 2 different senses of
being a different person that could come into play here. If X is the per-
son who exists before the amnesia and Y is the person who exists after-
wards, we might say that X has changed and become Y—she has
changed some of her characteristics—but X and Y are still the same
entity. This is not the change that is implicated by the persistence ques-
tion. If we say that X does not persist, that is to say that the entity that
was X has ceased to exist (or has died) and a new entity, Y, has come into
existence. We might think of the difference between these 2 senses as
the difference between being qualitatively the same and being numeri-
cally the same.18 Qualitative identity is the sharing of properties, so 2
different things can be qualitatively the same if they have the same char-
acteristics, eg, 2 white billiard balls are qualitatively but not numerically
the same, and qualitative identity comes in degrees depending on simi-
larity, eg, our 2 white billiard balls are more similar to each other than
to a white golf ball. However, the same thing numerically can become
qualitatively different from itself in the past, eg, when a white billiard
ball is painted red, and numerical identity is binary—it is either the same
ball or it is not. Psychological continuity theories associate qualitative
and numerical identity because, according to these theories, whether
or not a person ceases to exist may depend on whether her psychology
has undergone a particular type and amount of change.
Once we understand the persistence question as being about
numerical rather than qualitative identity, we can see why biological
continuity theories, where persistence is determined by the endurance
of the biological organism, have some attraction. We might want to say
that I was a foetus or that the person who has a car accident is the
same entity who is now in a persistent vegetative state. If you find
those statements attractive, then you are leaning towards the view
that identity over time is not simply a matter of psychology.† However,
*For Parfit, personal identity also requires “uniqueness,” or being the only con-
tinuer of a past self. He introduces this condition to deal with hypothetical cases
where a person undergoes fission and has 2 identical future selves.
†Alternatively, combining the biological and psychological views, one might think
that there are 2 entities, a person and a human organism, each with different per-
sistence conditions. For instance, McMahan identifies the person with the capacity
for consciousness and related brain functionings.19 According to him, the foetus
has not yet become a person and the entity in a vegetative state is no longer a per-
son, but both are parts of the same human organism. So the organism can exist
before the person comes into being and can survive after the person has died.
GOLD AND KYRATSOUS 1021
since we want to extract psychological implications, we will not con-
sider biological views here.
2. Characterization and narrative
In philosophy, the term “personal identity” usually refers to the
debate about what type of continuity is necessary for numerical iden-
tity, but persistence theories do not capture what is colloquially meant
when people talk about identity. For some psychiatric purposes, we
require an account of the development of identity understood as a
set of affiliations, which may change over time. We can ask another
set of questions, about how we characterise ourselves: What features
are most central to my identity? Which beliefs, values, desires, or other
psychological features make someone the person she is? Someone
who is having an identity crisis might recognise that she is numerically
the same person as previously, but ask who she is and whether she is
qualitatively the same person as previously. As Ricoeur says, being the
same is different from being a self.20
Rousseau's Confessions can be seen as an early attempt to answer
these questions. Amongst contemporary philosophers, Schectman has
taken them up, arguing that analytic philosophy's exclusive focus on
persistence is at odds with our practical concerns.21 For Schechtman,
it is not just that the person on the street tends to think of identity
in terms of the characterisation questions, she also thinks that charac-
terisation is key for answering philosophical questions such as why
people care about future pleasure or pain or how we attribute moral
responsibility for past actions. For Schechtman, such questions are
about qualitative rather than numerical identity to past and future
selves. She thinks that the answer is to adopt a narrative theory.
According to Schectman, persons constitute their identities by
organising their experiences into continuing narratives about their
lives, which incorporate the experiences (or anticipated experiences)
of their past and future selves. The characteristics that make up an
individual's identity are those that cohere together in a narrative struc-
ture (see also MacIntyre16).
The characterization theory is more than merely a descriptive
claim that people weave their lives into coherent stories (on which
see, eg, other works from Bruner, Dennett and Sacks22-24). What
Schectman adds is the argument that narrative coherence is the rele-
vant criterion for various practical concerns. However, we might won-
der why people's subjective narratives about their lives should be the
basis of what look like objective claims, such as whether they are mor-
ally responsible for their past actions. This is doubly true when we
apprehend that the telling of a story often involves a reinterpretation
of the facts to make a more coherent narrative and that some people's
subjective stories may end up being very far from the truth of their
lives. (See Schechtman25 for some attempts to counter this objection).‡
However, even at the descriptive level, it has been argued that the
narrative account is not sufficient for self. Zahavi argues that it does
not capture the phenomenology of our distinctive first‐person
perspective on experiences.27,28 If we strip away all narrative and
self‐construction, there is still a subjective sense of the ownership of
our experiences that exists prior to any reflection. Hence, Zahavi
claims that to make sense of a first‐person perspective, we already
need to invoke a self. He calls this immediate subject of experience
the “minimal self.” The minimal self is not extended in time, although
it can experience the passing of time, and it does not have a narrative
structure. Therefore, for Zahavi, the narrative self presupposes the
minimal self but not vice versa.
Strawson goes further and argues that narratives are not neces-
sary for either a descriptive or a normative theory of self.29 He allows
that some people may be diachronics, who experience themselves as
persisting into the past and the future, but argues that others (such
as himself) are episodics, who experience their self as existing solely
in the present. Even if their existence as an experiencer is fleeting, epi-
sodics may know, as a fact, that they are part of a continuing human
being (which may persist according to biological continuity views,
therefore, they could accept that they are numerically identical with
the human being according to those views). However, if episodics con-
sider that they will not exist in the past and the future, then they may
have no special concern for their past or any tendency to view their
lives in a narrative form. On a normative level, Strawson thinks that
this can still be a valuable way of living a life.
3. Personhood and agency
Another objection to persistence theories is that they take the
wrong approach to answering the motivating questions about egoistic,
moral, and compensatory concern because the answers require a prior
conception of agency or personhood. This criticism takes 2 different
forms, but both imply that being a diachronic agent is what matters.
In this context, philosophers use “agent” to mean the entity that takes
actions, which is different from the phenomenological feeling of self‐
ownership of those actions.
We can distinguish 2 sorts of arguments for the primacy of
agency: that it is diachronic agency rather than the metaphysics of per-
sonal identity that matters30 and that our metaphysical theories of per-
sonal identity depend on a conception of the person, which requires a
prior account of agency.31,32 In both cases, the idea of agency already
has an intertemporal aspect built into it.
Korsgaard argues that metaphysics is not the right foundation for
personhood and criticizes persistence accounts for thinking of the self
as a locus of experience, rather than as a doer.30 She inverts their
order of explanation. Instead of your leading one continuing life
because you are one person, she argues the reverse: that you are
one continuing person because you have one life to lead. Many of
our projects extend over time, and some of our ultimate ends, like
preserving our health, presuppose an ongoing identity. Choosing
amongst actions already takes us some way into the future, as actions
are temporally extended; to the extent that you regulate your choices
because you see yourself as implementing a life plan, you are already
identifying with yourself in the future, as a part of how you see
yourself now. Our practical projects give us a reason for regarding
ourselves as being the same person as the self who will occupy our
body in the future.
‡Worries about the status of reinterpretations also emerge in debates about
whether memory is a reliable epistemological source. Memory retrieval involves
reconstruction and simulation. But memory is still reasonably accurate on aver-
age and does not need to be exactly right to be functional.26
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For Korsgaard, viewing oneself as an intertemporal unity is a prac-
tical requirement of being an agent, regardless of the metaphysics.30
For others, the intertemporal nature of agency is a part of the meta-
physics.31,32 For instance, Rovane argues that the metaphysics of
personhood is intrinsically normative, so we should start by specify-
ing an “ethical criterion of personhood”32 and use that to determine
what entities count as persons. Rovane's chosen criterion is rational
agency, which involves a commitment to achieving overall rational
unity, such that a person's earlier commitments will govern their
later actions.
Both arguments for the primacy of agency connect agency to
rationality and reasons. Therefore, coherence and stability over time
are built into the idea of the person as an agent.§
3 | PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS INTO SELF
OVER TIME AND THE FRAMEWORK OF A
PERSON AS AN INTRAPERSONAL TEAM
REASONER
From these 3 philosophical approaches, we can distinguish 3 ways in
which a person can be a self over time, as an experiencer, a story teller,
and a doer, or the experiential, narrative, and agentic selves. These
correspond to 3 different ways someone can relate to his or her self
at a different time, which we might call the relationship between
different “synchronic selves.” We will avoid being too specific about
the duration of a synchronic self. In this, we follow Prebble, who
allows that the unit of time comprising the present can vary
depending on the aspect of the self under investigation.35 We explain
more below.
The self as experiencer is drawn from psychological continuity
accounts of persistence, from which we can extract the idea of self
over time as a matter of connectedness. The term “experiencer”
derives from Korsgaard's observation that psychological continuity
theories take the self to be a locus of experience.30 The experiential
self is not to be confused with the minimal self of Zahavi.27,28 The min-
imal self is pre‐reflective, whereas the experiential self includes the
possibility that the self has conceptual content and is not a phenome-
nological notion. The minimal self is restricted to James' I‐self, the sub-
ject of experiences, whereas the experiential self is his me‐self, the
object of this awareness, a person's mental representation or model
of her self (her “self‐concept”), which comprises all the things that
she perceives and knows about herself and which has semantic con-
tent.36 The I‐self is fleeting and prior to any reflection, although it
has the capacity for reflection and the experience of reflecting. The
me‐self includes the content of reflective thought at the present
moment, but it may also extend over a period in which there is no sig-
nificant change in the self‐concept.35¶
The experiential self may perceive that it is connected to past and
future selves, in the sense of Parfit discussed above, which may engen-
der a subjective feeling of connectedness with other synchronic selves.
Hence, the perception of connectedness may give rise to a phenome-
nology of continuity, a feeling that one extends through time, which is
nevertheless a feeling that is experienced at a time and therefore could
be had by a minimal self (Kennet and Matthews talk about “a distinct
feeling of there being a continuous experiential ‘worm’” connecting
the synchronic selves37). This is similar to an idea found in the writing
of James, who thought that the current self's perception that it is sim-
ilar to proximate selves gives rise to a sense that the current self is con-
tinuous with those proximate selves.36
The self as a storyteller derives from the narrative account of self.
The narrative self generates diachronicity through the ability of a syn-
chronic self to connect life events to the present me‐self. The syn-
chronic self becomes an author who constructs her self over time.
She is the same person, despite changing over time, provided that
she can make those changes intelligible to herself. The self as story-
teller leaves both the subjective and agential features of self unad-
dressed. Indeed, even though she is a proponent of the narrative self,
Schechtman has argued that her theory needs to be supplemented
by an account of “empathic access,” roughly the ability to recall past
emotions, thoughts, and feelings combined with a sympathetic attitude
towards the states recalled.38
The narrative self has been influential in theorizing about the self
in BPD.9,39 The impairments described in DSM‐5 have been viewed
by some in terms of defective narrative structures or narrative
sequences. This is most easily seen with regard to identity, where
it has been argued that a poorly developed self‐image corresponds
to incoherent narrative structures39 and the unstable sense of self
corresponds to discontinuous narrative sequences.40 However, the
appeal to narratives has also extended to self‐directedness, with
the idea that one makes sense of the acting subject within a narra-
tive framework that includes, eg, aspirations, values, and career
plans.39 The narrative approach is also central to clinical practice in
psychiatry, where the encouragement of storytelling and the subse-
quent assessment of event‐scripts forms a major part of history‐tak-
ing, clinical formulation (the theoretical explanation of clinical
phenomena used in diagnosis), engagement (patient involvement in
treatment), and of several aspects of psychotherapy.41 Therapeutic
interventions based on narrative have been used to give people a
phenomenological sense of continuity, including in the treatment of
BPD patients.42,43 Dimaggio et al have also proposed that facilitating
the formation of autobiographical memories can enrich the narrative
self of subjects with personality disorder, leading to a more stable
sense of identity.44
§Some people who take the agency approach also argue that there can be agents
that are either greater or lesser than the individual.32,33 One consequence of
Rovane's position is that groups may be agents, so long as they are committed
to achieving rational unity. Another is that there can be 2 agents in one human
being where there are distinct streams of rational unity, for instance, in cases
of multiple personality/dissociative identity disorder. Radden, based on cases
of extreme self‐fragmentation found in psychopathology, argues that “if our
subselves are construed more as agents than as the subjects of phenomenolog-
ical states, it seems possible to accept their being units smaller than body.”34
¶Some philosophers might prefer to think of the idea that the me‐self can be
extended over time as merely a convenient linguistic shorthand for an aggre-
gate of “timeslices,” the momentary selves that are found in metaphysics
(which are different from the minimal self as they are not restricted to phe-
nomenological content), over a period when the timeslices are all qualitatively
the same.
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However, if Strawson29 is right that the nonclinical population can
be nonnarrative, that challenges the idea that lack of narrative causes
the pathology in BPD. It is necessary to articulate the sense in which
self and identity is pathological in BPD. We suggest that the answer
may be found in a different conception of self, the agentic self.
The self as doer, or agentic self, is derived from theories of person-
hood and agency. Here, the source of self over time is the unity
imposed on synchronic selves who see themselves as a single agent
over time. The emphasis is on the conception of self as a temporal
entity, with a personal past, present, and future. Rather than starting
with a synchronic self that extends itself over time, we prioritise the
diachronic self. This is consistent with the intuitive idea that a person
who has a deficit in diachronic self, for instance, rapid and frequent
changes in values and life goals, may have problems in ascribing them-
selves a coherent synchronic self.
The recognition that synchronic selves are all part of the same dia-
chronic agent allows the current synchronic self to “identify” with past
and future selves. Identification is the recognition that a self in the past
or the future was or will be part of the same person. We can clarify this
with a metaphor from James. The owner of a herd of cattle can recog-
nise his animals because they are branded. However, “no beast would
be so branded unless he belonged to the owner of the herd. They are
not his because they are branded; they are branded because they are
his.”36 The selves at different times, which are equivalent to the cattle
in the metaphor, can recognise that they are branded the same; being
branded the same derives from being a part of the same entity over
time.
The semantic understanding that an action or experience was or
will be mine is typically accompanied by a feeling of “mine‐ness,” as a
person projects herself into the past and the future. This relates to
“autonoetic consciousness,” which provides a recollective experience
infused with a sense of one's self extended in time, which we define
and discuss in more detail below.45,46
Although connectedness and identification tend to cooccur, they
are conceptually different and they can come apart.37,47,48 Identifica-
tion can occur even in the absence of connectedness or a feeling of
cognitive continuity. It can unify synchronic selves that are very far
apart in time, which may be very dissimilar, and which the current syn-
chronic self may not feel connected to.
We can demonstrate this clearly using a model from decision the-
ory. In decision theory, when an individual has to make a series of
choices over time, it is standard to model the choice as being made
by a series of “transient agents,” who are the loci of experience and
who make choices. Each transient agent has its own preferences,
and, although some preferences may be held in common, there may
also be conflicts of interest. For example, the transient agents might
all prefer that some unpleasant activity be undertaken, such as writing
a report, but they may have differing preferences about which tran-
sient agent should do it. Standard decision theoretic reasoning allows
each transient agent to ask “What do I, as a synchronic self, want
and what should the present self do to achieve it?”. The transient
agents are modelled as experiencing selves. When there are conflicts
of interest between the preferences of transient agents, this reasoning
can lead to procrastination, the breaking of resolutions, and the failure
to implement long‐term plans.48-50
In situations with conflicts of interest, there are 2 different ways
that the transient agents in the model can achieve their long‐term
plans, which correspond to connectedness and identification.
They may recognise that they are connected to transient agents in
other periods, leading them to be concerned about the outcomes that
will be experienced in other periods—a concern that then gets incorpo-
rated into their preferences. This may reduce the conflict between the
transient agents' preferences, increasing the likelihood that they can
carry through long‐term plans. However, it is natural to think that peo-
ple place more weight on the present than the future,51 so connected-
ness alone may not be enough to resolve conflicts.48,50
Alternatively, the transient agents may identify with the person
over time, which is an agent that exists over time and pursues courses
of action that unfold over time, like the agent in the agentic theory of
the self. The person over time is composed of a “team” of transient
agents. When they identify with the team, the transient agents can
use intrapersonal team reasoning, a model of reasoning that allows them
to ask, “What do I, as a person (team) over time, want and what actions
should the present self take to achieve it?”.47,48,50,52 Identifying with
the team unifies the transient agents, regardless of how connected
they are with their past and future, or of their concern for the other
timeslices. It offers a sense of self that may be had by people who
are not narrative but also not pathological, like Strawson, and explains
how they can act on past commitments, pursue long‐term plans and
generally live successful lives.
In the usual case, we would expect a feedback loop between iden-
tification and connectedness: Identifying with your past and future
synchronic selves should also increase your sense of being connected
to them. But identification and connectedness are separate processes,
and it is possible to find cases where only one occurs.37
The model of self as an intrapersonal team reasoner addresses
agential elements of self. It includes both a present experiencer (the
transient agent) and an agent—or person—over time (the team of tran-
sient agents), who acts in pursuit of projects that extend over time. It
shows how experiencers can relate to an agentic self over time and
hence to the person's other experiential selves, via identification,
which need not involve any recourse to narratives about their own
lives. This is not to say that narratives are not helpful—some types of
narrative may boost the sense of continuity or identity between tran-
sient agents—but identification can be done even in the absence of
narrative self.
In addition, the model makes it clear how agentic accounts of self
can connect the unstable sense of self to another of the BPD diagnos-
tic criteria, that of disinhibition.47 In the DSM, disinhibition, which is a
broad, higher‐order personality trait, is characterized by irresponsibil-
ity, or a disregard for and failure to honour commitments, agreements,
and promises; impulsivity, or acting on the spur of the moment without
consideration of outcomes, and difficulty establishing and following
plans; risk taking, unnecessary engagement in dangerous and poten-
tially self‐damaging activities, without regard for consequences.7 Lack
of identification and lack of a sense of continuity can both lead some-
one to act on fleeting preferences, rather than on a long‐term coherent
plan. Conversely, either feeling connected to one's future self or iden-
tifying with the future self may make one more likely to consider the
consequences of one's actions and to act on stable values and goals.
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Psychologists have found that feeling connected to one's future self
may make one more likely to make sacrifices now for the sake of
long‐term goals.53,54 A relationship between identification and self‐
control has been found in the context of mental time travel, which
we will explain below.
4 | MEMORY AND SELF‐PATHOLOGY IN
BPD
Philosophy of personal identity traditionally thinks of memory as pro-
ducing a diachronic self.10 However, the relationship between memory
and selfhood is more complicated than that. The self is not only mani-
fest in memory but also in emotions, perceptions, and actions, ele-
ments of which can figure in the act of remembering, so connections
between self and memory can run in both directions. We review 2
rather different connections between memory and self, which are both
associated with the pathology of BPD, and relate them to the agentic
account of self.
4.1 | Episodic memory and mental time travel
Autobiographical memory is a complex mental system that allows peo-
ple to recollect information, events, and experiences from their
pasts.35,55 It involves both semantic and episodic memories. Semantic
memory is the recall of facts and propositions; episodic memory is
the recall of an experienced episode. There is a phenomenological dif-
ference because retrieving semantic memory feels like knowing,
whereas retrieving episodic memory typically involves reliving or
reexperiencing. The sense of mine‐ness that typically attaches to epi-
sodic memories is called autonoetic consciousness,56 which allows the
I‐self to feel that it has existed in the past or will exist in the future.35
We suggest that the unstable sense of self in BPD may be associated
with disruptions in this temporally extended I‐self.
For Tulving, the phenomenology of autonoetic consciousness is a
part of the definition of episodic memory and one of the functions of
episodic memory is to make mental time travel possible.57 Mental time
travel involves imaginatively projecting oneself into a mentally simu-
lated event, either in the past or in the future.26,56,58 Remembering
past episodes and imagining the future use some of the same skills
and brain circuitry,59,60 in particular, scene construction and self‐pro-
jection through time.61,62 Scene construction is the process of mentally
generating and maintaining a complex and coherent scene or event.63
Self‐projection is the ability to shift perspectives away from the imme-
diate present.64 Autonoetic consciousness is a type of self‐projec-
tion.65 For Tulving, autonoetic consciousness is a necessary correlate
of episodic memory.56 The phenomenology of ownership of the expe-
rience is a part of his definition of episodic memory; scene reconstruc-
tion without self‐projection would not count as episodic memory.
Prebble and colleagues argue that the minimal self is necessary for
the capacity for self‐awareness, which is considered “a vital precursor
to autonoetic consciousness and episodicmemory” because self‐aware-
ness is “necessary to differentiate amental state that is ‘remembered’.”35
They survey evidence that lack of pre‐reflective self‐awareness causes
deficits in autonoetic consciousness.
Neurological evidence also suggests a connection between
self‐projection and pre‐reflective self‐processing. The capacity for
self‐projection is supported by a core brain network, which is activated
in resting states.64 There is a neural overlap between this resting state
brain activity and general self‐referential processing, or the processing
of items and stimuli related to oneself.66 The brain areas involved in
self‐projection overlap with the cortical midline structures, which are
involved in self‐referential processing. Hence, it is not surprising that
self‐referential processing deficits, which have been studied in psychi-
atric disorders, can lead to changes in forms of self‐projection, such as
autonoetic consciousness.35
Neuroimaging studies of BPD patients have shown that they have
altered self‐processing.67 Further work is needed to explore the spe-
cific forms of and deficits in self‐projection involved in BPD. We spec-
ulate that the unstable sense of self is related to a disruption of the
temporally extended subjective sense of self, a function that is thought
to be supported by mental time travel.
Mental time travel also connects an impaired sense of self to dis-
inhibition. Mental time travel goes forwards in time, as well as back-
wards, and mental time travel into the future may be a prerequisite
for rational agency.37,68 Autonoetic consciousness allows us to pre‐
experience the future consequences of our actions, which can help
us to delay rewards and make choices that will be more advantageous
in the long‐term.69-71 Individuals who have a predisposition to be less
concerned about the future consequences of their actions benefit
most from imagining future scenarios.70 Impaired autonoetic con-
sciousness leads to problems with planning, prospective memory, epi-
sodic future thinking, and general thinking about one's future.72
4.2 | Autobiographical memory and dissociation
Autobiographical remembering also involves forms of processing that
enable the transformation of raw, experiential, and subjective material
to semanticized memories. Representing our self across time in this
manner gives temporal extension to the me‐self.35 Borderline person-
ality disorder patients have deficits in autobiographical memory. These
are sometimes explained using a narrative account of self, focusing on
the semantic contents of memory retrieval. We will show that the def-
icits are also consistent with an agentic account.
Borderline personality disorder patients have abnormal autobio-
graphical memory functioning; for instance, they show memory biases
in autobiographical recall.73 Their memory deficits have been con-
nected to problems with their narrative selves. Memory problems have
been examined in the context of dissociative experiences, where the
subjects may have large gaps in their memories, may be bothered by
how much they have forgotten and may not remember what they
did or said when angry.74,75 However, dissociation is also associated
with behavioural dyscontrol,76 which suggests that the memory defi-
cits can also be explained by processes related to agency.
Borderline personality disorder patients often have mild and fluc-
tuating dissociation, which Meares (borrowing from Janet) calls “con-
tinuous forgetfulness.”77 Dissociation involves the disruption of
consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment.
Dissociation ranges along a spectrum ranging from the
nonpathological, such as daydreaming, to the pathological, such as
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dissociative amnesia, “amnesia for personal information or events that
are too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness.”75 In BPD,
dissociation is often pathological, with dissociative amnesia leading to
characteristic mental holes or blind spots in patients' autobiographical
memories. There is abundant evidence that susceptibility to dissocia-
tion is connected to having experienced traumatic events and adverse
early environments.78
Dissociation has been connected to the narrative self. Bessel Van
Der Kolk79 writes that “traumatic memories are fundamentally differ-
ent from the stories we tell about the past. They are dissociated: The
different sensations that entered the brain at the time of the trauma
are not properly assembled into a story, a piece of autobiography.”
However, he also stresses that the narrative self, which is rooted in
language, cannot substitute for the moment‐to‐moment sense of self,
which is based primarily on physical sensations and emotions, resulting
in action.
Another psychological phenomenon that has been thought to
undermine the coherence of the autobiographical narrative of BPD
patients is the formation of overgeneral memories. People are said to
have overgeneral memorywhen they tend to recall categories of events,
rather than specific memories, even when explicitly instructed to recall
specific events. Overgeneral memory is thought to be a coping strat-
egy that avoids the retrieval of specific painful memories. Jones and
colleagues found that patients suffering from BPD had difficulty in
recapturing specific personal memories, particularly relating to nega-
tive events.80 (Although for a critical appraisal that disputes the phe-
nomenon, see Van den Broeck et al81) Meares hypothesizes that
BPD patients will display overgeneral memory as a way of avoiding
traumatic memories and that this lack of specific memories also pre-
cludes patients from forming coherent self‐narratives.9
However, it is also possible that dissociation and memory prob-
lems result from agentic deficiencies. The same processing styles that
cause behavioural disinhibition can cause instability of self, if they
are applied to self‐relevant information. Berzonsky categorizes people
according to their identity processing styles.82,83 The way that people
process self‐relevant information is related to their approach to per-
sonal decision making and problem solving. The avoidant‐diffuse iden-
tity type is characterized by impulsive and ad hoc problem solving,
focusing on the short‐term, and generally postponing decisions “until
situational consequences and rewards dictate a course of action.”82
Borderline personality disorder patients are predominantly avoidant‐
diffuse.84 Their processing of self‐relevant information is influenced
by impulsivity, emotion‐focused coping strategies, and tendencies to
rely on an external locus of control. Hence, the sort of processing def-
icits that causes disinhibition may also manifest as self‐processing def-
icits, which cause the characteristic mental holes or blind spots that
can figure in the autobiographical memories of BPD patients.
5 | CONCLUSION
The agentic self provides a novel theoretical framework for research
on identity disturbance in BPD, which complements the narrative
approach. We used the decision theoretic model of the self over time
as an intrapersonal team reasoner to clarify features of the agentic self.
Agency contrasts with connectedness and unifies the self over time in
a way that is compatible with being nonnarrative. The intimate connec-
tion between diachronic agency and actions over time provides a the-
oretical basis for the cooccurrence of unstable sense of self and
disinhibition in BPD patients.
The agentic approach illuminates diachronic identity and self‐
directedness. Identity disturbance in BPD has both diachronic and syn-
chronic elements. The 2 types of deficit may be related. If someone has
constantly changing values and life goals, then it may not be surprising
that they do not have a coherent synchronic self. The model of the
agentic self suggests the potential for investigating the construct of
self instability by focusing on temporal aspects of self and mental time
travel.
In sum, the agential self is a promising addition to the literature on
BPD. In this short paper, we cannot do justice to the many connections
between agency, action over time, and self. The agentic approach to
BPD merits further research.
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